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Abstract 
As jurisdictions reform gender identity laws to accommodate transgender and 
intersex people, this article speculatively explores a more fundamental shift: 
eliminating state law’s role in determining and assigning gender status altogether. 
Adopting a feminist perspective, we explore what the meaning and effects of 
comprehensively reforming legal gender might be in terms of gender’s constitution as 
a socio-legal property, differentially recognised and protected by diverse but unequal 
bodies. Our discussion proceeds along two intersecting paths. The first concerns the 
different classificatory methods which could enable state law, without assigning 
gender, to continue to regulate gender identity decisions, thereby allowing state law 
to remain involved in tackling gender discrimination. The second concerns the 
changing form gender might take in conditions where state law withdraws its 
allocative function. These paths converge in a final discussion which considers what 
legal and political effects might follow from gender becoming a property that is 
individually and collectively cultivated.  
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If the state decertified gender, what might happen to its meaning and value? 
 
Over the past decade, transgender activists and scholars have been at the forefront of 
moves to modify national systems of sex/ gender1 certification, working to make them 
more responsive to those whose gender identities change or appear to have been 
misrecognised.2 Across different jurisdictions, these moves have taken varying forms: 
from adding additional gender categories to birth certificates,3 to reforming gender 
transitioning procedures so they are based on self-identification rather than medical 
judgment,4 to reducing the number of official contexts in which gender identification 
is required. Yet, despite variations in approach, what these contemporary moves to 
modify gender certification systems share is a policy lens trained on transgender (and 
to a lesser degree intersex) people as a disadvantaged minority deserving better 
accommodation.  
This article takes a different approach. Instead of approaching gender 
assignment from the perspective of minority need, which risks perpetuating the notion 
that those being accommodated are a socially differentiated, pathologised group, it 
explores options for legal reform that would impact on how gender is determined for 
all members of a polity.. In particular, we are interested in reforms that would mean 
gender was no longer legally assigned at birth. But while straightforward to phrase, 
what declassifying or “decertifying”5 gender identity might bring into being, in 
                                                             
1
 The relationship between sex and gender is complex and contested; for useful recent accounts of their 
interrelationship see J. Conaghan, Law and Gender  (2013) 17-23; S. Cowan, ‘Gender is no Substitute 
for Sex: A Comparative Human Rights Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity’ (2005) 13 
Feminist Legal Studies 67-96. To avoid repeatedly referring to sex/ gender, we use “gender” to cover 
both the state’s legal assignment of sex or gender status, and the expression of sex and gender 
identities.  
2
 See, for instance P. Currah and L.J.  Moore, '“We Won't Know Who You Are”: Contesting Sex 
Designations in New York City Birth Certificates' (2009) 24 Hypatia  113-35. For a useful 
international report, see M. van den Brink and J. Tigchelaar, M/V en verder Sekseregistratie door 
de overheid en de juridische positie van transgenders, (2014) WODC, Ministerie van Veiligheid & 
Justitie. Auteursrechten voorbehouden. 
3
 See, e.g. NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v. Norrie [2014] HCA 11. 
4
 See for instance the analysis of Argentina’s gender identity law by L. Mottet, 'Modernizing State 
Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good 
Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of Transgender People' (2013) 19 Michigan Journal 
of Gender and Law 376-470.  
5
 We use this phrase for reforms that would abolish the present system of gender certification, which 
assigns, confirms and authorises people as male or female. 
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conditions where deregulation invariably involves new forms of regulation, is far 
more open and uncertain. In complex regulatory conditions, such as those governing 
contemporary Britain, decertification could mean the state’s withdrawal from 
assigning gender while still recognising self-determined gender identities, for 
instance, in anti-discrimination law, equality monitoring or census surveys. But who 
gets to determine what gender means? Would state law defer to individual 
understandings; would it continue to establish criteria for gender and the spectrum of 
recognisable genders despite no longer classifying individuals; or, in ways more akin 
to the regulation of religious plurality in Britain, would state law defer to gender-
identity criteria and categories established by collective bodies? This article explores 
these different possibilities. Approaching gender as a socio-legal property, it 
considers what could happen to this property, in terms of how it is regulated and what 
it might mean, if the state’s relation to gender identification radically changed. 
In so doing, we want to contribute to three debates. The first concerns current 
law reform discussion on how states should relate to gender status. Decertification is 
not currently a major political demand in Britain,6 although it has been proposed by a 
number of activists and academics internationally.7 In Britain, the merits of self-
determination (if not quite full informalisation) have generated proposals to reduce 
the range of official contexts in which a person’s gender identity is considered 
relevant information.8 In our view, political interest in gender’s decertification or, at 
least, in legally recognising  greater gender flexibility is likely to intensify as 
transgender and intersex demands are attended to, and as other reforms which 
attenuate gender-based forms of differentiation, such as same-sex marriage and shared 
parental leave, bed in. This article teases out some of the implications of reform, 
posing questions about the form it might take, and what the implications of 
decertification might be. Without posing a model law, we want to trouble the oft-
made assumption that decertification would necessarily remove the state from 
regulating gender statuses and identities altogether. There are many ways state law 
                                                             
6
 House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, 'Transgender Equality', (2015) at 61 
7
 E.g., D. Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics and the Limits of Law 
Revised and Expanded Edition (2015); Cowan, op. cit., n. 1, p.90. 
8
 See Press Association, 'Call to Remove Gender from UK Passports and Driving Licences', The 
Guardian, 2 January 2016 and Press Association, 'Government to Review 2004 Gender Recognition 
Act', The Guardian, 7 July 2016. The British Minister for Women and Equalities’ proposed that it 
might be possible to abandon recording individual gender on driving licenses and passports (Press 
Association, 2 January 2016; 7 July 2016).  
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can continue to regulate gender. Exploring what some of these are, in the light of 
wider regulatory discussions,9 contributes also to more general debates about the 
relationship between identity categories and social reform, particularly conversations 
about the ongoing salience (or otherwise) of categories constituted in conditions of 
inequality for social justice projects.10  
Our second aim is to contribute to methodological developments within 
feminist legal studies. Recent interest in bill-drafting as a way of exploring what the 
law could be like11 and the transnational Feminist Judgments Project are two 
examples of a methodological turn that combines social justice commitments with a 
renewed interest in the flexibility and progressive potential of legal form.12 This is 
not, it should be stressed, an uncritical attention; it does not treat legal form as 
politically neutral. At the same time, there is a creative and political interest in the 
capacity of statute-writing and legal judgments to take more feminist directions. In 
this article, we take up this reworking of legal form to explore what classificatory 
principles might be available, and what choices they pose, in conditions of gender’s 
decertification. As with feminist statute and judgment writing, this is a “thought 
experiment” intended to open up and stimulate more practical discussion, to provide a 
ground from which to critique what is and to explore some paths for what could be. 
At the same time, while we cannot know what decertification would do, or how it 
might be legally embedded, we also cannot assume gender’s ontological character 
would remain unaffected. Thus, in exploring the possible consequences of legal 
reform, we also seek to contribute to a third set of debates; concerned with what it is 
we are talking about when we talk about gender.  
At the heart of debates between pro and anti-transgender feminists lies 
disagreement about what gender is, whether it is an oppressive, exploitative regime or 
system that necessarily produces unequal statuses, norms, and ways of being; or is 
first and foremost an intimate, natural attachment. Approaching gender as a 
propertied attachment, as we do here, does not mean rejection of more systemic 
                                                             
9
 See for instance, J Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103-146. 
10
 For a scathing analysis of the usefulness of racial categories constructed during apartheid for a post-
apartheid South Africa, see G. Maré, Declassified: Moving Beyond the Dead End of Race in South 
Africa  (2014). 
11
 See for instance the Irish Access to Abortion Bill, M. Enright et al, ‘General Scheme of Access to 
Abortion Bill 2015’ (2015) 5 feminists@law 1-32. 
12
 See R. Hunter et al, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (2010). 
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approaches.  At the same time, it foregrounds (as analytical object) the gender identity 
paradigm that has come to dominate liberal political and legal discourse, in which 
gender is understood and treated as something authentic, and of value, which people 
hold, and which, like other kinds of personal attachment, they have a right to hold and 
have protected. This way of approaching gender has become increasingly pervasive, 
even as its propertied terms are often implicit rather than explicitly identified. But it is 
also an approach more radical feminists reject on the grounds that protecting gender 
as an intimate attachment romanticises and so misreads gender’s pernicious and 
oppressive character.13 This article explores these disagreements in the context of 
imagining fundamental reforms to the current system of gender certification. Such 
reforms, as we discuss, do not necessarily mean the end of gender as social property; 
nor would gender (or particular genders) necessarily diminish in value. At the same 
time, we are interested in considering the relationship between reform and gender’s 
ontology: could decertification change what gender is and if so, in what ways?  
But before going any further, we need to ask: Why should nation-states, such 
as Britain, stop determining and assigning legal gender; why should they dismantle a 
framework of direct control, albeit one that works largely through a relay of health 
practitioners, parents and local registration offices, for a framework based on 
structuring or steering the self-regulating acts of others? Arguments for reform have 
largely been framed in terms of the experiences of transgender and intersex people, 
navigating a world in which their gender is constantly challenged or in doubt.14 Dean 
Spade illuminates the troubling complexities and inconsistencies of the administrative 
web that snares transgender people in the US, a web that renders self-determined 
gender status legally and socially precarious.15 Other research identifies the 
difficulties those seeking to transition, as in Britain, face due to normalising, 
expensive, slow, medicalised and disciplining procedures.16 While governments, in 
                                                             
13
 S. Jeffreys, 'Transgender Activism: A Lesbian Feminist Perspective' (1997) 1 Journal of Lesbian 
Studies 55–74; S. Jeffreys, Gender Hurts: A Feminist Analysis of the Politics of Transgenderism 
(2014); J. Raymond, The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (1979). 
14
 J. A. Greenberg, Intersexuality and the Law: Why Sex Matters (2012); S. Monro, 'Transmuting 
Gender Binaries: The Theoretical Challenge' (2007) 17 Sociological Research Online; A. Sharpe, 
Foucault's Monsters and the Challenge of Law (2010). 
15
 D. Spade, 'Documenting Gender' (2008) 59 Hastings Law Journal 731-842; Spade, op. cit., n.7, 
pp.92-93; see also Currah and Moore, op. cit., n.2. 
16
 E. Grabham, 'Governing Permanence: Trans Subjects, Time, and the Gender Recognition Act' (2010) 
19 Social & Legal Studies 107-126; S. Hines, Transforming Gender: Transgender Practices of Identity, 
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Britain and elsewhere, debate the minutiae of reforming their transitioning processes, 
the psychological pain, stress, time, expense and inadequacy of reclassification 
procedures for those whose gender identity diverges from the binary sex they have 
been assigned at birth begs the question: would it not be preferable to eliminate these 
problems in one sharp move by eradicating the requirement for a state-assigned legal 
gender altogether?  
There are other reasons also for proposing such a change. If states play an 
important role in the interpellation of people as gendered subjects, processes of 
certification in which individuals are assigned a gender, and then obliged to repeat 
that gender across various procedures and activities, constitute a significant aspect of 
how gender, as a binary set of differentiated categories, is sustained and entrenched.17 
As Carol Smart (1989) argues in her ground-breaking book, Feminism and the Power 
of Law, legal norms and assumptions play a powerful role in asserting how things are, 
“impos[ing their] definition of events on everyday life”, in part because law 
represents itself as embodying “a claim to a superior and official field of 
knowledge”.18 Not only does a system in which everyone is officially gendered from 
birth reinforce the notion that gender is a vitally important marker or characteristic of 
what (or who) one is, it also confirms the presumption that people are exclusively, 
and naturally, either male or female. But what can eliminating state assigned gender 
status achieve, in terms of “undoing” gender inequalities or moving towards a less 
gender-differentiated society – feminist political aspirations which underpin the 
analysis offered here?  Critics of gender-neutral law, for instance, argue that in a 
gendered society removing law’s ability to differentiate diminishes its capacity to 
ameliorate or compensate for gender inequalities in work, home-life, media and other 
spheres. This is an argument against formal equality (or sameness) as the remedy for 
gender disadvantage.19 Child care and sexual violence are two core areas where critics 
argue gender neutral laws do little to combat existing inequalities, and may, by 
masking socially inscribed gender distinctions, have iniquitous effects instead, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Intimacy and Care (2007); House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee, op. cit., n.6; Monro, 
op. cit., n.14. 
17
 Conaghan, op. cit., n. 1. 
18
 C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989) at 4. 
19
 Conaghan, op. cit., n. 1., pp. 77-80; V. Munro, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-Evaluating Key 
Debates in Feminist Theory (2007) 132-143. 
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whether in relation to the unequal distribution of domestic responsibilities,20 or in 
relation to men’s use of sexual violence to control women.21  
Yet, applying the critique of gender neutral law to the declassification (or 
more flexible, self-determined classification) of gender identity begs an important 
question: is decertification a form of gender neutral law? At one level, it seems this 
par excellence, with its implication that people become gender neutral subjects from a 
state perspective. At the same time, as we explore, reforming the current system so 
gender is no longer assigned does not mean the state necessarily withdraws from 
recognising gender identities or from recognising gender as a relation of inequality. 
Without certifying individual gender at birth, state law can continue to recognise 
gender, and regulate the gendered decisions, practices and resource allocations of 
other organisational bodies in various ways. This becomes apparent when we consider 
other areas of inequality and identity, such as religion and sexuality. Both are areas 
where, at least in Britain, the general lack of an assigned legal identity does not equate 
to the absence of legal recognition or lack of state engagement. Indeed, the equality 
law framework established in Britain’s Equality Act 2010 not only protects people 
from discrimination on grounds that include legally uncertified identities, such as 
religious beliefs, race and sexuality, but also protects people who have been 
“mistakenly” identified in relation to a prohibited ground and discriminated against as 
a result.  
 State withdrawal from recognising only its own officially determined gender 
statuses does not necessarily leave people without legal tools to challenge 
discrimination (leaving to one side the testing question of how effective such tools 
might be). It also doesn’t necessarily mean that organisations and other public bodies 
cannot base allocation and membership decisions on gender grounds (unless this is 
also explicitly prohibited). At the same time, changing the law so people might legally 
hold multiple, non-binary, evolving gender identities creates complex and interesting 
                                                             
20
 N. Iyer, 'Some Mothers Are Better Than Others: A Re-Examination of Maternity Benefits' in 
Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy, ed. S. Boyd (1997) 168-
194; B. J. Risman, 'Gender as a Social Structure: Theory Wrestling with Activism' (2004) 18 Gender & 
Society 429-450. 
21
 Conaghan, op. cit., n. 1.; C. A. MacKinnon, 'Reflections on Sex Equality under Law' (1991) 100 Yale 
Law Journal 1281-1328; S. Walklate, 'What Is to Be Done About Violence against Women? Gender, 
Violence, Cosmopolitanism and the Law' (2008) 48 British Journal of Criminology 39-54. 
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challenges for a range of bodies and activities.22 In the discussion that follows, we 
focus on one aspect of this challenge: the relationship between regulatory law and 
gender-based organisational decision-making. What happens to property in gender 
when the state no longer assigns it?  
 
GENDER AS PROPERTY 
Feminists have long used property tropes to encapsulate women’s relationship to men; 
Margaret Davies provides an excellent critical account of the material and symbolic 
dimensions of this subject-object relationship.23 Treating women as men’s possession 
is not, however, the property framework drawn on here. Rather than detailing how 
male/ female relations are property-like, we are interested in how people’s 
relationship to their own gender identity itself becomes depicted and treated as 
property. Our discussion of this relationship combines three qualities or dimensions 
that liberals and their critics associate with property in the person: social power; 
autonomy; and protection. The first builds on Cheryl Harris’s ground-breaking 
writing on whiteness as property, which addresses the privileges and advantages 
people gain from being coded as white.24 Harris’s account inspired a cluster of 
subsequent research exploring the unequal capital associated with different social 
                                                             
22
 Issues have been raised in relation to medical practice, see L. Khan, 'Transgender Health at the 
Crossroads: Legal Norms, Insurance Markets, and the Threat of Healthcare Reform' (2011) 11 Yale 
Journal of Health Policy Law & Ethics 375-418; gender monitoring, see A. S. Chaudhry, 'Lessons 
from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking Self-Determination for Transgender Individuals Can Learn from 
American's History with Racial Classification Categories' (2009) 18 Temple Political & Civil Rights 
Law Review 505-15 and Mottet, op. cit., n.4; single-sex institutions such as prisons, see S. Bendlin, 
'Gender Dysphoria in the Jailhouse: A Constitutional Right to Hormone Therapy?' (2013) 61 Cleveland 
State Law Review 61 957-82; schools and community organisations, L. M. Brymer, 'Better Dead Than 
Co-Ed-Transgender Students at an All-Women's College' (2011) 18 William & Mary Journal of 
Women and the Law135-59; shelters, L. Mottet and J. M. Ohle, 'Transitioning Our Shelters: A Guide to 
Making Homeless Shelters Safe for Transgender People' (2003) The National Coalition for the 
Homeless and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute 
<www.thetaskforce.org/transitioning-shelters/>; sports activities, see C. F. Sullivan, 'Gender 
Verification and Gender Policies in Elite Sport Eligibility and “Fair Play”' (2011) 35 Journal of Sport 
& Social Issues 400-419; as well as in relation to psycho-social attachments, see L. D. Wayne, 'Neutral 
Pronouns: A Modest Proposal Whose Time Has Come' (2005) 24 Canadian Woman Studies 85-91. The 
focus, however has been on genders deemed ambiguous or in transition with a spotlight on pre- or 
postoperative “transsexuals”, intersex people and on those whose queer, transgender, or subversive 
presentations unsettle conventional gender categories. See, for instance House of Commons Women 
and Equalities Committee, op. cit., n.6, p.9; L. E. Kuper, R. Nussbaum, and B.  Mustanski, 'Exploring 
the Diversity of Gender and Sexual Orientation Identities in an Online Sample of Transgender 
Individuals"' (2012) 49 Journal of Sex Research 244-254. 
23
 M. Davies, 'Queer Property, Queer Persons: Self-Ownership and Beyond' (1999) 8 Social & Legal 
Studies 327-352. 
24
 C. I. Harris, 'Whiteness as Property' (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1707-91. 
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identifications.25 Drawing from this work, one line of argument might suggest that 
cis26-masculinity is the only gender to historically function as valuable property – 
bestowing resources and opportunities on those who can claim it, causing harm to 
those subject to its power.  From this perspective, female and transgender status 
function only as negative property, generating not strength but privation and want as 
Sheila Jeffreys remarks, “’Woman’ is the result of the experience of living as a 
woman under male supremacy.”27 While we do not fully sign up to Jeffreys’s 
categorical framing, her formulation acts as a reminder that property is not just about 
the unequal capital which people “hold”; fundamentally property is a relation 
between subjects that, in Margaret Davies’ words, “has things as its focus”.28 In other 
words, the property rights, including gender property rights, of one subject not only 
impact on the property rights of another, but are constituted through and in relation to 
others’ powers and deprivations, particularly when it comes to what that property 
means, does and enables.29  
Property’s second dimension is less concerned with the social power that 
different gender statuses make available and more with people’s presumed capacity 
and entitlement, within contemporary liberal regimes, to define and govern their inner 
gender. Treating ownership as the link between personhood and self-determination,30 
it is a property dimension anchored in a set of liberal ideas that associate autonomy 
with the right to own one’s labour, powers and capabilities. From this perspective, 
gender as a property of the self is an effect, expression of, and contribution to, 
individual autonomy. Paradigms of self-ownership have been subject to considerable 
criticism, including for their capacity to legitimate exploitative relations and 
workplace domination thanks to the notion of the contracting or “voluntarily” 
                                                             
25
 See for instance E. Grabham, '"Flagging" the Skin: Corporeal Nationalism and the Politics of 
Belonging ' (2009) 15 Body and Society 63-82; S. Keenan, 'Subversive Property: Reshaping Malleable 
Spaces of Belonging' (2010) 19 Social and Legal Studies 423-39. 
26
 “Cis” is the current term to describe people whose gender identity matches that assigned at birth. 
27
 Jeffreys, op. cit. (1997), n.13, p.66. 
28
 M. Davies, 'Queer Property, Queer Persons: Self-Ownership and Beyond' (1999) 8 Social & Legal 
Studies 327-352 at 328. 
29
 Gender’s property power might also be coded as one of guardianship or stewardship, involving a 
responsibility to care, support and protect – a responsibility historically been framed in patriarchal 
terms. 
30
 Self-ownership is also supplemented by a different approach to property and personhood in which 
development and freedom of the self depends on our relationship to intimate and meaningful things. 
E.g., see M. J. Radin, 'Property and Personhood' (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957-1015. 
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alienated self.31 They have also been supplemented by accounts of the entrepreneurial 
self in contemporary neoliberalism32as risk-managing individuals invest in developing 
skills and capabilities, forging as we discuss below the “right” gender repertoire, in 
order to engage in economically maximising behaviour. Lisa Adkins argues that there 
has been a historical movement from the possessive self to the entrepreneurial self, 
whose value depends on the contribution others make also (as consumers, clients, and 
audience).33 The role of others is important in thinking about gender identity. There is 
a tendency on the part of some advocates of gender self-determination to treat gender 
as something determined only by its “owner”. But if gender is (or has) property, this is 
a form of property that is socially created and socially priced.  
The third dimension of property concerns the legal rights different social 
identities acquire. Approaching human rights and anti-discrimination law as orders 
that bestow property34 sheds light on their political claims to redistribute the capital 
and power that different identities hold.35 But while one aspect of identity property is 
tuned to what it can do, another is tuned to its own protection and safeguarding. 
Jennifer Nedelsky suggests a propertied conception of the self gives rise to a subject 
“in need of boundaries to secure it from invasion by others”.36 Treating gender 
identity as a protectable part of the subject also contributes to a territorial imagination 
as gendered “vulnerabilities” but also gender-based rights and privileges become 
subject to safeguards as law contributes to protecting, but also to regulating, the scope 
and limits of one’s identity estate. For instance, does gender identity include specific 
practices, beliefs or modes of appearance; and does protecting gender identity mean 
                                                             
31
 For critical engagement, see C.B. Macpherson, The Political Philosophy of Possessive Individualism. 
Hobbes to Locke. (1962); also J. H. Carens, 'Possessive Individualism and Democratic Theory: 
Macpherson's Legacy' in Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of CB 
Macpherson, ed. J. H. Carens (1993) 1-18; C. Pateman, Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: 
Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts’, (2002) 10 Journal of Political Philosophy 20-53; J. 
Richardson, ‘Feminism, Property in the Person and Concepts of Self’ (2010) 12 British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 56-71. 
32
 See, for example L. McNay, 'Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault’s 
the Birth of Biopolitics' (2009) 26 Theory, Culture and Society 55-77. 
33
 L. Adkins, 'The New Economy, Property and Personhood' (2005) 22 Theory, Culture and Society 
111–130. 
34
 Writing on human rights as property, Macpherson argues that treating the right to a decent quality of 
life as a property right resonates with older conceptions of property, which encompassed a person’s 
rights, liberties, and capacities; it also, he suggests, strategically recuperates property’s moral and 
discursive force. C. B. Macpherson, 'Human-Rights as Property-Rights' (1977) 24 Dissent 72-77. 
35
 D. Cooper and D. Herman, 'Up against the Property Logic of Equality Law: Conservative Christian 
Accommodation Claims and Gay Rights' (2013) 21 Feminist Legal Studies 61-80. 
36
 J. Nedelsky, 'Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self' (1990) 30 Representations 162-189 at 168. 
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protecting the performance and expression of these also?37 So far, we have suggested 
a socio-legal account of gender as property engages elements of social power, 
autonomy and protection. But what else is required for gender to function in this way; 
does gender as property need to be severable, recognised and, if recognised, by whom 
or what?  
In their interesting account of identity performances at work, Lisa Adkins and 
Celia Lury explore how employees exercise property in gender when they can choose 
which gender to perform from a repertoire of workplace options.38 While the ability to 
assume a different gender enactment seems to imply gender’s ability to be separated 
from the one performing it, in this analysis we do not treat severability as an essential 
aspect of property. Instead, we build on a “property as belonging” framework in 
which the conventional subject/object relationship (of control, exclusion and 
severability) is supplemented and tangled up with a second property relationship, 
concerned with the relationship between part and whole.39  The complex relationship 
between these two property frames comes into relief in political and theoretical 
conflicts between transgender women and anti-trans feminists. For instance, we 
witness it in the way anti-trans feminists criticise transgender women for 
“appropriating” an identity that does not belong to them – an arrogation, it is claimed, 
that repeats longer histories of men’s appropriation of women’s resources and value.40 
For anti-trans feminists, such appropriations invoke a subject-object relationship of 
belonging in which gender is treated as an attachment that can be selected, put on, and 
removed.41 Certainly, some transgender and queer activists draw deliberately on more 
                                                             
37
 For related discussion regarding the legal protection accorded religious identity, see Cooper and 
Herman, op. cit., n. 35. 
38
 L. Adkins and C. Lury, 'The Labour of Identity: Performing Identities, Performing Economies' 
(1999) 28 Economy and Society 598-614. 
39
 D. Cooper, 'Opening up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the Productive Life of 
Property' (2007) 32 Law & Social Inquiry 625-664; Keenan, op. cit. n.25; on the impossibility of 
severing labour from the worker and its implications for property in the self, see Pateman, op. cit., n. 
31. 
40
 J. Raymond, The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (1979), see also K. Browne, 
'Womyn’s Separatist Spaces: Rethinking Spaces of Difference and Exclusion' (2009) 34 Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographer  541-56. Discussing the Michigan Womyn’s Music Camp, 
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flexible and severable conceptions of gender.42 However, others take up a part-whole 
conception of belonging to argue their gender “belongs” in ways that cannot be 
differentiated from the experience of belonging which cis-women describe.43 A part-
whole approach depicts gender as a constitutive dimension of human life that 
contributes to its lived experience and formation. But gender is not just a “part” that 
belongs; to the extent that relations of propertied belonging are also concerned with 
“proper place” in terms of what belongs together and what does not,44 gender’s 
organising principles contribute to determining where we belong45 and who we 
belong with. This last has proven a source of major disagreement as we discuss. 
Property involves relations of belonging, but not all relations of belonging 
count as property. To function as property, they need to be supplemented by particular 
forms of power-bestowing recognition46 since it is through recognition that relations 
acquire their propertied force (although relations of belonging also exercise force 
outside of their propertied status). But if property relations depend on being 
recognised, whose recognition counts?  Paralleling work on self-regulation,47 
scholarship in legal pluralism has problematized the notion that the only authoritative 
provider of recognition is state law, exploring the legal (or law-like) character of other 
normative regimes, from customary and religious law to convention and rule-based 
orders within educational institutions, work sectors and social communities.48 In the 
case of gender identity, civil society organisations may not only recognise genders 
unrecognised by state law; they may also recognise, and so give, gender a classed, 
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racialized, sexual and religious specificity in contexts where state law claims to only 
notice broad abstract categories.49  
For people with unconventional or disputed gender identities, recognition 
according to community rules or organisational norms has proven crucial. Yet, for 
members’ self-identified genders to also have wider force, community or 
organisational recognition needs to have some degree of power and authority. 
Informal peer-based recognition for transgender people, for instance, may enhance 
self-esteem and solidify new gender identifications, but may not provide access to 
desired goods in terms of work, recreation, education, volunteering and healthcare. 
Accessing these resources and opportunities has become a major area of contention 
between transgender women and anti-trans feminists in relation to a range of gender-
specific organisations, from women’s colleges50 to rape counselling lines51 and sports 
teams.52 To the extent one of the “goods” these women’s organisations provide is 
recognition, experience has been mixed.53 While trans-positive women’s 
organisations deliberately seek to mirror people’s self-identified gender,54 other 
organisations have taken a very different approach – one high-profile example being 
the annual Michigan Womyn’s Music festival.55In line with many other women’s 
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organisations internationally, the music festival rejected the notion that all self-defined 
women belonged together. Extensive protest and criticism led the festival to officially 
recognise transwomen as women; however, organisers argued festival participation 
was restricted to a subgroup of women, namely “womyn born womyn”.56 Thus, from 
a property perspective, the femaleness that transwomen possessed was not so much 
denied as devalued through the requirement for additional identity property in order to 
participate.  
Adopting a legal pluralist approach multiplies the bodies acknowledged as 
capable of bestowing recognition to include community organisations as well as 
states. In so doing, the competing, often antagonistic, character of norms and rules 
exercised by different bodies comes to the fore. Legal pluralism, importantly, directs 
attention to how diverse regulatory and normative orders interact. In our context, such 
interactions include the battles between feminist organisations and transgender 
activists over definitions of gender, as well as the relationship between organisational 
norms and rules about participation and state law. A legal pluralist account might ask: 
When do organisational rules and norms that deny or devalue transgendered people’s 
gender property get recognised and respected by state law? What difference might the 
state’s withdrawal from assigning gender identity make to how it responds to 
organisational and individual forms of self-determination? In the next section of the 
article, we address these issues, teasing out some of their complexity. States can 
structure and guide organisational and individual gender identity decisions in many 
ways; our focus is on how state law structures and penetrates gender identity 
classifications.  To tease out some forms this can take, we consider two legal 
decisions. These decisions operate in very different contexts; however in both, the 
question of identity-property comes to the fore in conditions where individual, 
organisation, and state law disagree about how a person’s identity should be 
recognised; the force it should have; and the rights it should be entitled to.  
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RECOGNISING AND REGULATING IDENTITY PROPERTY 
To the extent that the state protects its own identity allocations more sturdily than 
those of other bodies, its proposed withdrawal from assigning gender may seem to 
imply some diminution in gender’s propertied power and in the capacity of particular 
gender identities to be protected. This might generate reasonable fears among those 
reliant on their official legal status to protect them from civil society attempts to deny 
their gender – whether the denial is from a medical professional, health insurer (in 
countries, such as the USA, which rely on private insurance), employer, homeless or 
domestic violence shelter, sports organisation or fellow user of a public lavatory (a 
site of considerable contemporary legal and political controversy in the USA).57 
Having an official gender status can provide an authoritative resource in situations of 
perceived gender misrecognition. But just because states withdraw from determining 
and assigning gender does not mean they cannot recognise gender determinations by 
others.  
Assuming it remains legal for organisations to allocate membership or 
resources by gender, and of course that may not be the case, one pressing question 
becomes whether or not state law should recognise or “certify” organisational criteria 
for ascertaining gender when this clashes with the self-designation of potential 
participants.58 The Nixon case in British Columbia, Canada demonstrates some of the 
tensions and dilemmas this question raises.59 The case concerned a transwoman 
denied membership of a rape counselling service on the grounds she had been raised 
male, and therefore from the organisation’s perspective was not a woman;60 or, if she 
was a woman, not part of the subset of women - those with experience of gender 
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oppression “from birth” – that the organisation’s membership criteria required.61 
Nixon filed a human rights complaint and won at the British Columbia Human Rights 
Tribunal, before losing her case in judicial review and, again, on appeal on the 
grounds that, as a non-profit organization under s. 41 BC Human Rights Code 1996, 
the rape counselling organisation had the legal right to determine who counted as a 
woman for their own membership purposes. Interestingly, this case occurred in a 
context where state law did certify gender identity rather than one where the state had 
withdrawn from the task. At the same time, it reveals how precarious property in 
gender identity can be. Although Nixon was recognised as a transsexual woman with 
a female birth certificate, the force of this status was substantially undermined 62 by 
the court’s refusal to require that civil society organisations, such as the rape 
counselling organisation, recognise it.  
The Nixon case is helpful for our purposes in two respects. First, it shows how 
multiple, diverging gender definitions can be overlaid onto a particular encounter, 
such that someone recognised as female by one legal/ normative order may not be 
recognised as female by another. Second, it demonstrates the indirect power of state 
regulatory frameworks, as statute and judicial interpretation combine to structure 
property in gender.63  State law can regulate gender identity in several ways beyond 
the mere certification of someone’s sex. One, as we have noted, is by recognising 
organisations’ definitional autonomy when it comes to the meaning of, say, 
womanhood (although once an organisation has set their criteria, however informally, 
they may be legally compelled to treat individual applicants fairly according to its 
terms). A contrasting approach requires organisations to recognise and accept those 
who self-identify with the relevant gender regardless of whether the organisation 
wishes to recognise them in those terms. Despite their differences, what these two 
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approaches accomplish is to reframe what counts as the paramount property.  Instead, 
of focusing on the property attached to gender, it is property in the classifying 
decision which is key (trumping other property claims) - a property that state law may 
bestow upon either organisations or individuals.64 But property in the decision can 
also be limited by regulatory frameworks which structure and limit permissible 
choices, for instance by determining that certain kinds of identity criteria are legally 
unacceptable.  A good entrée to thinking about this issue is the British Jewish Free 
School (JFS) case.65  
The JFS case concerned a dispute over the legal parameters of the criteria used 
to determine whether a child was Jewish for the purpose of admission to a Jewish 
school. With its legal focus on race and religion rather than gender, this case may 
seem a tangential example; however, its relevance for our discussion is that being 
Jewish in Britain is not an identity or status set by the state. The JFS case therefore 
illustrates how state law can regulate community determinations of identity or 
membership even when it does not actually determine someone’s identity status. 
Conventionally, in Judaism, someone is Jewish if their mother is Jewish – an identity 
that can be achieved through matrilineal descent or by conversion.66 In this legal 
dispute, the Jewish Free School turned down an application for admission from a boy 
whose mother had converted to Judaism through a non-orthodox conversion process, 
a conversion not recognised by the school, which only recognised orthodox 
procedures. Since being Jewish in British law is treated as an ethnicity as well as a 
religion, the case fell within the regulatory purview of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
The question for the court was whether the criteria the school applied for determining 
Jewishness (either matrilineal descent or recognised conversion) constituted racial 
discrimination under the RRA s.1.67 In other words, was JFS’s refusal to recognise the 
boy’s property in Jewishness for the purposes of admission unlawful? 
The dissent argued that it was lawful; they held the policy did not breach the 
RRA as it involved the application of religious rather than racial criteria. The school 
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did not deny the boy was ethnically Jewish; it was simply that he did not meet the 
school’s criteria for being religiously Jewish based on orthodox Jewish law. In this 
sense, the school recognised the boy’s Jewishness as something he possessed and was 
entitled to; however, it could not give rise to the effects – namely admission - which 
he sought. Like Nixon or the transwomen seeking admission to the Michigan 
Womyn’s Music Festival, what he possessed was the wrong kind of property for this 
particular purpose. The majority, however, disagreed; they declared the school’s 
policy of determining Jewishness according to a matrilineal line of descent to be 
directly discriminatory on racial grounds.68 As a result of the decision, the school 
changed its admissions policy to emphasise religious observance and participation 
rather than halachic Jewish status. According to critics, this legally mandated policy 
change, based on a refusal to recognise that a religion could be lawfully based on 
descent, imposed on the school a Christian conception of religion in ways that not 
only interfered with, but made it illegal to apply, Jewish notions of religious 
affiliation.69 In his dissenting judgment, Lord Brown remarked, “Jewish schools in 
future, if oversubscribed, must decide on preference by reference only to outward 
manifestations of religious practice. The Court [] judgment insists on a non-Jewish 
definition of who is Jewish.”70 Danchin and Blond develop this point, “In JFS, a 
majority of the judges appear to understand religion as an epistemologically distinct 
form of non-ethnic belief that parallels both Christian commitment and an 
Enlightenment view of religious identity as a matter of internal private conscience.”71 
In other words, the JFS case not only challenged the lawful contours of Jewishness as 
a religious category but also tacitly reworked the meta-category of religion itself. 
So, how does the JFS case help us to think about gender and, specifically, the 
capacity of the state to regulate property in gender without determining people’s 
actual gender? Since this article is a speculative one, our interest is not in closely 
parsing current law but to identify and explore some approaches to identity 
categorisation available to be taken up. Religion, in many ways, is a good analogy to 
gender because, when it comes to a religion such as Judaism, the British state plays no 
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role in directly assigning status. At the same time, as Didi Herman has discussed, 
modern British law’s treatment of Jewish identity demonstrates the power state law 
can exert over an identity category – shaping how it can be deployed and what its 
members can do.72 Thus, state law can regulate how civil society bodies determine 
category membership by making certain criteria-decisions impermissible, by defining 
the category (for instance, gender or religion) in particular ways, or by switching 
categories so organisational decisions, which seem to be made in relation to one 
category, are re-recognised as being in fact an (unlawful) other.  
While they come from different jurisdictions, relate to different legal 
frameworks, and address different kinds of identity-property, the JFS case is an 
interesting counterpoint to Nixon. In Nixon, the court refused (or deemed themselves 
unable) to stop the rape counselling organisation from excluding the claimant, despite 
the fact she was legally defined as a woman, because the organisation had the right, 
according to the court, to not recognise her as a woman (or, in their terms, as the 
“right” kind of woman). In the JFS case, by contrast, although the claimant did not 
possess a legal status as Jewish, the court nevertheless stepped in to prohibit the 
school policy on the grounds it breached the RRA by unlawfully applying a race-
based test. In thinking about gender as property, then, what these two cases illustrate 
are the complex and uncertain effects that legalising self-determination may have. 
While it can give individuals a heightened sense of self-ownership as felt gender 
remains un-trumped by a countervailing legally imposed classification, what self-
defined gender actually makes possible remains an open question.73 Individual self-
definition may be protected and empowered through regulatory strategies that require 
others to recognise it. But it is also possible that while people are recognised as self-
possessed gendered individuals, law limits the protection, entitlements and capital that 
their gender can bear. 
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GENDER AS CULTIVATED PROPERTY 
If gender is no longer a birth “right”, labour, care, and encounters with others may 
provide the means through which gender identities develop and acquire life. In the 
previous section we considered the effects of decertification on state law’s capacity to 
continue to regulate gender as socio-legal property. In the discussion that follows, we 
explore what it could mean for gender to move from being a property assigned by the 
state to one grown and cultivated by individuals within particular social contexts. 
What might it mean to treat gender in this way, with its implication that gender is not 
an identity or status such that one either is male or female (or some other gender 
designation) but instead a quality that can be grown or developed? Does gender then 
become a matter of degree, and what might this mean legally? Would it give 
employers a license to advertise not for men or women but for particular intensities of 
gender performance, such as high femme or ultra-butch? Could organisations select 
members and users also with regard to the care and effort with which a particular 
gender identity is held; where single-gender provision, for instance, reflects not 
simply an allocated status as male or female, but an assessment of how 
comprehensively and fully a particular identity is cultivated, recognising that some 
forms of cultivation, as with religion and ethnicity, may generate vulnerability. And 
what about those who do not cultivate any gender identity?  If gender identifies a set 
of categories demanding effort and commitment, a refusal, unwillingness or inability 
to exert effort in this direction might mean no gender is selected or developed, 
paralleling the case of non-religious identity in a society where religion continues to 
have an institutional and cultural role.74 What material and cultural implications might 
come from rejecting gender identities as some people are already attempting, or from 
performing gender abysmally, in conditions where gender is not legally required but 
continues to have property? These questions and concerns may sound far-fetched; yet, 
they reflect the current experience of many “non-passing” transgender and intersex 
people for whom a legal gender identity is not sufficient status or protection, and 
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where discrimination arises because people are deemed not female or male enough.75 
Decertification, then, would seem to cast the net of cultivation and effort far more 
broadly, but what does “cultivation”, in this context, mean? What is this gender that is 
being worked upon?  
We can understand cultivation here in several different, if interconnected, 
ways. One line of thinking, based on developing property in the self, identifies 
cultivation with a subject who puts time and effort into developing their “inner” 
qualities, furthering their personal attributes and skills. Here, cultivating one’s gender 
may be part of personal self-development and the search for authenticity, but it may 
also involve augmenting one’s personal economic and social value in conditions 
where market rationalities of competition and social investment extend into ever 
increasing areas of life.76 This more instrumental approach to cultivation seems to 
foreground appearance and performance and, understood in this way, the need to 
cultivate one’s gender is far from new. Feminist scholarship has long addressed such 
processes,77 exploring the care people expend in disciplining their bodily movements, 
voice, and expressions so they are gender appropriate. Writers on gender transitioning  
also describe the acute pressures; the feelings of embarrassment for self and others 
that arise on occasions when people slip up or fail to pass, revealing in the process a 
prior (and feared as always still there) corporeal gender.78 But cultivation can also 
suggest a seemingly more detached or expressive register in which gender functions 
as a kind of cultural project; gender here shapes subjects and may be internalised but 
it is not defined as, or reduced to, an inner truth. In her discussion of the “new 
economy”, Lisa Adkins argues that gender “is characterized by principles of 
performance… and gender hybrids may be performed, mobilized, and contested by 
workers in a variety of ways in order to innovate and succeed.”79 This kind of 
performance, she suggests, differs from older ways of doing gender, not simply 
because its creative, alienable aspects are emphasised but also because of the new 
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importance of “customer” or “audience effect”.80 Adkins, importantly, emphasises the 
unequal relationship of men and women to workplace gender performances in 
conditions where women may struggle to claim “ownership of their cultural work”.81 
However, the point we want to take up relates to the co-produced or collaborative 
character of gender as an “external” cultural project.  
 Approaching gender as collectively cultivated, particularly when it is 
cultivated as a shared cultural project, foregrounds ways of thinking about gender 
more familiar to ethnicity or religion. Collectively developed genders can take a 
conventional form but what we want to consider here are those networks and 
communities in which dissident or non-normative genders are cultivated. These 
community networks and attachments exist despite the fact people’s legal gender 
status does not meaningfully reflect them, and despite the fact that people can 
sometimes contribute to building gender-specific communities (as with transmen in 
lesbian communities) even when their own identity no longer aligns with the 
gendered community of affiliation either.82 The presence of dissident gender identities 
spurs us to ask: what might happen to such deliberately cultivated non-hegemonic 
gender identities if they were no longer undermined or trumped by state legal 
categories? Whether state law’s withdrawal would empower or safeguard the 
collective self-possession they instantiate remains an open question. The evolution of 
gender identity is not dependent on legal structures alone, and reform may produce far 
from progressive effects83given its capacity to also trigger counter-measures intent on 
sustaining more rigid gender binary frameworks. At the same time, a key motivation 
for exploring decertification has been to consider its capacity to support gender 
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identity change that would allow gendered identities to evolve, fluctuate, be held in 
plural ways,84 and also to be dropped.85 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has woven together three lines of discussion: the regulatory options 
available for state law to supervise and structure gender-based decisions in conditions 
where gender identity is no longer state certified; the implications of decertification 
for gender’s ontology; and the effects changes might have on the capital, protections 
and self-determination that property in gender make available. As stated at the outset, 
such a discussion can only be speculative; however, in our view exploring the 
potential shape and implications of reform is worth pursuing – in part because it sheds 
light on the property character of gender and other identities within a human rights 
and equality law context, but also because it highlights some of the policy choices to 
be made if the legal assignment of gender was to be reformed. Like other forms of 
property, gender can have property status without being allocated by the state; in 
other words, gender’s property status can outlive the current certification structure. 
However, to count as property and to have property force, gender needs institutional 
or community recognition. From a legal pluralist perspective, recognition of gender in 
ways that are property bestowing is broader than state law. At the same time, official 
legal regimes are important (if not monopolistic) determinants of what community 
and organisational recognition (and non-recognition) can do. As we have discussed, 
the regulatory role of state law is apparent in several disputes between feminist/ 
lesbian organisations and (potential) transgender participants as state institutions and 
courts determine whose gender and decision-making property rights they will 
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recognise and protect: those of the single-sex organisation wishing to define and 
determine what and who is female, or the rights of transgender participants claiming 
their entitlement to belong. Identity disputes like these, as we have addressed, are not 
exclusive to gender (although the struggle over transwomen’s membership in feminist 
organisations has a distinctive current political flavour). Similar disputes over 
definition and decision-making authority arise in relation to other identities, 
particularly in contexts when having the “right” identity opens up desired 
opportunities, membership and other resources, as witnessed in the JFS case.  
Yet, if states withdraw from legally determining gender, it is plausible to 
suggest that gender’s form may change. Instead of everyone having a gender 
assignment as male or female, options open up for people’s identities to be gendered 
in non-binary ways, and for people to be more or less gendered. As we have noted, 
these options already informally exist. Thus, one key question is what might happen 
to these presently evolving social forms if they no longer have to compete for ground 
with state law’s gender assignment; if the take-up of informal gender identities does 
not have to confront and work on a terrain of incompatible, already legally gendered 
subjecthood. One possibility here is that, like religious faith, gender might become 
increasingly something to cultivate (or to choose not to cultivate) in conditions where 
its property value depend (at least in part) on the work and effort invested in its 
accomplishment.  In a still gendered society this might work to disempower those 
who feel unable or chose not to develop a gendered identity; making gender property 
dependent on labour and effort is not necessarily a progressive development even if it 
seems to favour flexibility and diversity.  But what other ways forward are there? Are 
we limited to thinking about gender identity in propertied terms; and, if so, is 
“choice” the most progressive formulation available, with its recognition that gender 
can be flexible, plural and created (or rejected)? Certainly, many feminists would 
argue that understanding gender in this fashion spectacularly misses the point – that 
gender is a relational system of domination and structural asymmetry. From this 
perspective, gender is not something to recuperate, and to approach it as a selected 
identity, particularly an individually selected identity that generates claims for 
protection and entitlement, does little more than echo those many other contexts 
where social inequalities have become rendered intelligible through neoliberal 
discourses of choice.  
25 
 
Yet, while this critique has merit, we also think gender politics and the 
gendered identities that have been spawned are more than the sum of domination plus 
neoliberal choice. Socio-political opposition to gender as a form of domination, 
discipline, control, and wider social organisation has not simply evacuated gender but 
generated in turn other kinds of gender practices. Although these largely reject 
gender’s formal propertied status, they have more complex relationships to the social 
power, self-definition and protection that gender as informally recognised property 
can provide. Some dissident gender politics, such as radical feminism, may aim for 
gender’s abandonment (even as they perform their own, particular, resistant form of 
gender identity). Other dissident politics treat gender’s potential more equivocally, 
recognising gender’s conceptual elasticity and capacity to give (and take) shape from 
oppositional, progressive and transformative politics as well as conservative ones. 
These include what we might call prefigurative gender projects, which seek to 
actualise in the present the future gender forms (for instance, no genders, fluid 
genders, or new genders) that are sought. They also include stylised gender 
enactments performed to protect and sustain flourishing dissident communities; and 
they include the strategic take-up of gender meanings, codes and legacies to advance 
other political goals - witnessed in the women’s peace movement of the 1980s, which 
married conventional gender norms of domesticity, peace, care and women’s 
responsibility for rearing future generations with radical norms of female self-
sufficiency, physical competence, political activism and lesbian desire. It is 
impossible to know what contribution decertification might make to the future of 
these kinds of gender politics and the gendered identities they generate. However, 
removing the state from the task of assigning gender might free gender from certain 
forms of direct state control. Clearly, indirect forms of control or regulation will 
continue to have consequences, but the naturalised, taken-for-granted notion of 
gender as a common-sense binary structure would be, at the very least, shaken. 
 
